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Abstract 
This paper examines the development of consumer IoT solutions for the control of electrical energy in the home. Use of smart 
appliances is at the centre of the UK Government’s strategy for managing CO2 emissions and domestic electricity demand. The 
current market for IoT-enabled products that control domestic lighting and heating is rapidly evolving with a range of devices 
already available. Development of demand side response solutions will see these devices and smart appliances being integrated 
into consumer energy management solutions. The paper examines the architecture and security implications of these 
developments, explores some of the security risks and identifies a number of mitigation measures. It concludes by identifying 
future work that is required to address the security threats, both in the home and to the electricity supply system.  
1 Introduction 
From a consumer perspective the concept of living in the 
Internet of Things is probably best conceptualised in terms of 
the creation and delivery of “Smart Homes”. Whereas, from a 
governmental perspective, a key driver for promoting smart 
homes and smart appliances is to address the socio-economic 
challenge of managing domestic energy demand, thus 
reducing CO2 emissions and making best use of infrastructure 
and renewable energy sources. The UK Government’s 
Industrial and Clean Growth Strategy [1] seeks to encourage 
consumers to become more directly involved in managing 
demand in the electricity system using smart appliances that 
react to the availability of electricity on the grid in determining 
their operational cycle. It is estimated that heating in buildings 
and industry currently accounts for around 32% of the total UK 
CO2 emissions [2]. 
 
A smart appliance can be characterised as one that is 
communications-enabled and responsive to price and/or other 
signals by moderating its electricity consumption. The degree 
to which the energy responsive functionality, referred to as 
demand side response (DSR), is automatic will be determined 
by the appliance’s smart functionality and the degree to which 
the consumer chooses to enable responses to price or other 
signals. The smart appliances are likely to include: cold and 
wet goods typically found in a domestic kitchen or utility 
room, electric vehicle (eV) charge points, electric heating 
controllers and future smart electrical devices used in the 
domestic environment. 
 
The increasing distributed control of the UK electricity power 
network using consumer smart technologies exposes it to 
cyber security risks [3]. This paper considers the cyber security 
risks that may impact grid security, the security of the smart 
appliances, device interoperability and data privacy.   
 
The structure of the papers is as follows, section 2 examines 
the likely future connections to a “Smart Home” and their 
relationships in respect of electricity supply and consumption. 
Section 3 explores the potential interactions between 
organisations involved in the production, transmission, 
distribution and use of electricity. Section 4 examines the 
security risks, section 5 discussed potential mitigation 
measures, whilst section 6 contains conclusions and 
recommendations for future work.   
 
2 The future smart home 
2.1. Current smart home solutions and appliances 
Many potential first generation components of a future smart 
home are already on sale to the public, for example: 
• smart heating solutions offered by HIVEÔ, 
LightwaveÔ, MiHomeÔ, nestÔ and WiserÔ - 
typically comprise a proprietary hub with Wi-Fi 
connected replacement heating controllers, 
thermostats, and thermostatic radiator valves 
(TRVs); 
• smart lighting systems HIVEÔ and PHILIPSÔ - 
delivering wireless control of smart light bulbs using 
a ZigbeeÔ network form a Wi-Fi enable proprietary 
hub; and 
• ‘smart’ power via plug-in RF controlled adaptors 
(all of the above manufacturers); 
• smart energy storage, for example the Tesla 
PowerwallÔ, a battery and inverter system that 
stores electricity from the homes solar panels nd 
using it to reduce the amount of electricity drawn 
from the public supply. 
These smart devices are generally provided with 
manufacturer specific applications (apps) that can be 
downloaded from the AppleÔ and/or GoogleÔ app stores. A 
number of them work with integration products such as 
Amazon’s alexaÔ.  
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A range of ‘smart’ appliances are now being offered for sale 
and generally rely upon a Wi-Fi connection to a home hub or 
router to enable user access to the smart functionality. 
Appliance types that offer remote control or programming 
include: 
• Smart cooking appliance, e.g. microwave, oven, 
hobs, kettles and coffee makers; 
• Smart cleaning appliance, e.g. dishwashers, washing 
machines, and robotic floor cleaners; 
• Smart fridges.  
Typically, the above appliances employ a manufacturer’s app 
that permits a user to schedule their use and to remotely vary 
that schedule where the home router or hub has Internet 
connectivity.  
 
The functionality outlined above is primarily low-level 
automation, partially replacing a person’s physical interaction 
with the device or appliance by remote control via an app. A 
number of the smart solutions offer the capability for the user 
to programme ‘recipes’ using IFTTT (If This Then That), a 
web-based service that allows users or developers to create 
chains of simple conditional statements, called applets [4]. 
IFTTT is the IoT equivalent to the ladder logic found in an 
industrial programmable logic controller (PLC). 
2.2. Anatomy of a future smart homes 
To deliver the UK Government’s vision of reduced domestic 
CO2 emissions and managing electricity demand using DSR 
the future smart home will become a significantly more 
complex electrical and electronic environment. The 
schematic in Figure 2 illustrates a potential future smart 
home. 
 
The smart home draws electricity from the public supply and 
supplements it with energy generated through a solar panel 
and which stored in a local battery system. The distribution of 
the energy is though type approved wiring, outlets and 
control components that comply with the electrical safety 
regulations, currently BS 7671 [6]. 
 
The external electricity supply passes through a smart meter 
that provides meter readings to the data communications 
centre (DCC) and receives time- and demand-based tariff 
information from the consumer’s energy supplier. The smart 
meter communicates via a home area network (SMHAN) 
with a consumer access devices (CAD) to display electricity 
consumption and tariff information. 
 
The smart home occupier has a number of smart appliances, 
e.g. a smart lighting system operated through a standalone 
local hub via a smart phone app, both of which are 
periodically updated via the Internet. The major appliances, 
i.e. cooking and wet goods are connected to a local customer 
energy manager (CEM) hub, which in conjunction with a 
cloud-based energy management service (EMS) provide DSR 
functionality.  
 
The occupier’s fossil-fuelled car has been replaced by an eV 
which is charged using a private charger. The occupier has 
agreed to host a public eV charger which is accessible on the 
road-side perimeter of the property.  
Figure 1  - Potential energy related systems in and connectivity to future Smart Home. Adapted from [5] 
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The above vision of the future smart home assumes that an 
external supplier will have direct control over home devices, 
as part of a DSR contract with the occupiers. An alternative 
approach may be to use tariff variations as signals to an in-
home CEM, with the occupier determining the relative price 
sensitivity of different appliances.   
2.3. Demand side response (DSR) 
The UK electricity transmission and distribution network is 
managed by a Electricity System Operator (ESO) who is 
responsible for balancing the network, i.e. maintaining the 
supply in line with demand, and managing a safe, resilient, and 
cost-effective electricity system [7]. 
 
DSR is a tool that can enable the ESO to manage short-term 
capacity issues, both in terms of generation and constraints in 
the transmission and distribution of the electricity to end users. 
Through the use of temporal changes in wholesale tariffs the 
ESO can signal system capacity. For example, when the 
generated electricity is likely to exceed demand, particularly 
from renewable sources, the tariff could be reduced to 
encourage consumption, by appliances or for storage in 
domestic batteries and eVs. At times where demand is likely 
to exceed supply the tariffs can be raised to discourage 
consumption, e.g. through reduced use of appliances or by 
drawing upon stored energy held in domestic batteries systems 
and parked eVs. 
 
The tariff price signalling to domestic consumers is likely to 
be handled by energy management companies – these market 
players may be energy supply companies performing an 
arbitrage role or service companies offering tariff (price) 
comparison services to allow consumers to choose the 
optimum time to use electricity. The consumer may decide to 
automatically reduce consumption for some appliances based 
on specific tariff changes, time of day and weather conditions. 
 
A second element of DSR is the ability to force reductions in 
consumption, which provides a short-term protective measure 
for the transmission and distribution networks in periods of 
excessive demand. This type of signal may, for example, 
temporarily suppress the use of a compressor in a domestic 
freezer. Response to these signals is likely to be automatic for 
any DSR enabled appliances. In this scenario the appliance 
may resuming normal operation after a pre-set time or if 
specific conditions are fulfilled, e.g. the temperature in the 
freezer rises to a specified but still safe level. 
2.4. DSR components in the smart home 
To implement DSR is a domestic environment the following 
components will be required: 
• DSR-enabled smart appliances, these may be 
connected directly to the internet via a home router or 
via a local CEM; 
• a CEM, which may be a local physical device, e.g. a 
local hub, or a virtual cloud-based device; 
• a consumer/user interface, that may be provided via a 
smart phone app or a web-based portal; 
• tariff information, which may be provided via the 
smart meter over the SMHAN or via the EMS. 
• connectivity to an EMS that receives capacity and 
tariff information (wholesale and/or consumer) from 
the ESO and energy suppliers. 
 
Use of a CEM potentially allows a consumer to predetermine 
how to respond to tariff changes through use of semi-
autonomous control functions, i.e. responding in a pre-set 
manner to specific demand or tariff signals, or it may only 
provide a gateway function with all control actions determined 
by a cloud-based service [8] based on individual customer 
decisions and their electricity supply contractual obligations. 
A CEM may integrate aspects of both control methods to 
ensure emergency signals and additional flexibility services 
are implemented in accordance with the supply contract, e.g. 
during times of severe network stress. The semi-autonomous 
nature of the CEM represents a potential security risk that is 
discussed in section 4. 
 
3 Future electricity market participants 
The UK electricity market is governed by a complex 
regulatory framework comprising licences issued by Ofgem 
for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and 
industry rules and codes that dictate how different parties 
interact. As noted in Government and industry consultations 
[9, 10] the nature of the UK electricity supply system is 
changing with increased demand, from eVs and 
decarbonisation, and increased generation and storage within 
the distribution network. The safe and secure operation of the 
electricity supply system has to date been primarily the 
responsibility of a small number of organisations, namely the 
ESO and the transmission and distribution system operators. 
 
Introduction of smart functionality will introduce new 
participants: 
• suppliers of smart appliances and smart add-ons to 
existing systems – their role is fundamental to the 
overall security of real-time implementation of DSR, 
through their implementation of trustworthy and 
secure and DSR functions; 
• EMS – these services could be provided by the 
consumer’s energy supplier, but it is likely that this 
role will be attractive to existing internet service 
providers, for example Amazon linking their online 
retail capability with their apps and voice control 
functionality offered by alexaÔ; 
• eV charge operators – increasing use of eVs will lead 
to consumer demand for faster charging and this 
require installation of charge points that employ high 
current (>13A) or 3-phase connections. Supply and 
operation of these charging points, whether public or 
private, may be handled by specialist operators that 
provide the charge points, aggregate demand and 
arrange supply and billing of the electricity 
consumed. 
 
Presence, or absence, of appropriate legislation, regulations, 
standards and codes of practice may determine the extent to 
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which the activities, products and services of these new 
participants impact the security, safety and stability of the 
electricity supply system. 
 
4 Security risks 
From a security perspective the UK Government has identified 
four policy principles [9] that it considers critical for energy 
demand to be managed using smart appliances: 
• Grid Security: the prevention of outages on the grid 
caused by erroneous operation of smart appliances; 
• Cyber-Security: the prevention of unauthorized 
access to smart appliances by third-parties; 
• Data Privacy: the secure storing of data on the device 
or with any controlling party; and 
• Interoperability: the ability of smart appliances to 
work seamlessly across any DSR services operated 
by any electricity system participant. 
 
Threats that affect grid, security, cyber security and data 
privacy are likely to emanate in the main from parties with 
hostile, malicious or criminal intent, whereas interoperability 
issues may arise as the unintended or unforeseen consequences 
arising from changes to the system and/or its components. 
4.1. Potential security threats 
From an attacker’s perspective the electricity supply system is 
a critical part of a nation’s infrastructure. Attacks on Ukrainian 
electricity distribution companies [11-14] are indicative of 
how the electricity supply system can be a target for hostile 
nations. Hostile actions against the DSR system and smart 
home may result in: 
• damage to or destruction of electricity supply 
equipment, assets connected to the network or homes; 
• disruption of the DSR system by denying, degrading 
or delaying tariff or other signals aimed at managing 
consumption, these may have significant financial 
and regulatory consequences for suppliers, system 
operators and consumers; 
• detection, discover or disclosure of data and/or 
information about the electricity supply systems and 
their operation, about customer premises and the 
consumers themselves. This information may be 
company sensitive/confidential, or personal 
information as defined by GDPR [15], the loss or 
misuse of which may result in prosecution and 
significant fines. 
 
In addition to GDPR considerations the electricity supply 
network is covered by the NIS Regulations [16] which imposes 
strict security breach reporting requirements on operators of 
essential services (OES). As DSR becomes an integral part of 
network operations, EMS operators will be required to achieve 
the security and reporting standards required of other OES. 
4.2. Impact of an IoT approach to DSR 
The use of smart appliances to implement DSR exposes the 
system to threats that have been evident in other consumer IoT 
devices. For example, poor security engineering and default 
configuration of home routers and CCTV cameras enabled 
malware developers to create the Mirai botnet [17,18]. In 
practice the smart home architecture illustrated in Figure 1 is 
likely to be a composition of consumer IoT devices from 
various manufacturers or service providers, employing 
common software platforms and libraries. Jerkins [19] notes 
that “Most owners of these [IoT] devices are neither security 
aware or motivated to secure their IoT devices. Manufacturers 
of these devices are not currently motivated by market forces 
or regulatory requirements to improve the security of their 
products.” 
 
The security of the domestic IoT environment in which DSR 
components will be installed is potentially further 
compromised by the presence of other personal devices 
connected to the home router. For example, homes will contain 
a range of personal IT devices, often running unpatched or 
insecure software and IoT toys, games that are not secure-by-
design. 
4.3. Privacy and Trust 
The introduction of smart energy solutions will potentially 
bring an unprecedented level of collection of electricity 
consumption data from domestic premises. The UK smart 
meters provide limited granularity by recording energy use 
against in half hour bands [20], whereas smart energy solution 
of CEM could in principle collect data every second or few 
seconds, thus allowing very detailed consumption patterns to 
be gather and fine-grained control over energy demand. 
Collection of data at this granularity would be a significant 
privacy issue as it would allow detailed profiling of consumer 
and/or household behaviour. This becomes particularly 
intrusive when linked to smart phone location data used in geo-
fencing, where consumers programme actions based on their 
proximity to home, and the collection of charging information 
for any eVs used by the household. 
 
In setting out its requirements for the implementation of the 
smart metering programme the UK Government published a 
specification for the meters and the security of their 
communications and operation [21]. The specification seeks to 
protect Personal Data and ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of data held in, processed by and/or communicated to 
the DCC by the meter. Similar government requirements do 
not currently exist for the smart energy devices that will 
deliver the DSR functionality discussed in this paper.  
 
Given the emergent nature of the DSR market and recent 
behaviour by a number of web-based organisations, e.g. 
Facebook’s collection and use of personal data, there may be 
legitimate concerns about the potential for EMS providers and 
suppliers of smart appliances/solutions to collect pattern of life 
data which may be resold for advertising or other commercial 
activities.  
 
Use of cloud-based delivery of the CEM component may cause 
concerns about GDPR compliance, particularly where the 
service is delivered by large US corporations. Schneier [22] 
identifies four general systems that people use to incentivize 
trustworthy behaviour: 
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• Morals – the behaviour of social media companies 
and the prevalence of web site tracking suggests that 
the relying upon moral behaviour of organisations is 
unlikely to achieve an acceptable level of 
trustworthiness – consumers can choose whether to 
use social media, but in the era of the smart home they 
are unlikely to be able to choose not to subscribe to 
DSR services; 
• Reputation – anecdotal evidence about the impact of 
data breaches on corporate reputations suggest that 
reputational harm following a serious data breach is 
generally short lived, so the threat of loss of 
reputation is unlikely to be an effective means of 
maintaining security of the domestic energy supply 
system; 
• Institutions – organizations are generally governed by 
rules and laws that induce managers and boards to 
behave according to the group norm. The electricity 
supply industry has to date operated within strict 
licence conditions and codes relating to data security 
and privacy. The move to smart energy solutions and 
smart appliances risks eroding these protections in 
favour of increased data collection and sharing; 
• Security systems – as noted in the previous section 
the UK smart metering programme was designed 
with security in mind. The current relative lack of 
smart energy security standards and obligations to 
demonstrate adherence to and maintenance of 
compliance with them is a serious weakness. 
 
5 Potential mitigations 
Potential mitigation measures applicable to development and 
use of IoT-based smart solutions as a mechanism for managing 
domestic energy demand can be grouped into the four 
categories described in the sub-sections below. 
5.1. System architecture 
System architectural measures can be separated into two 
components: the IoT-based energy control architecture and the 
physical energy distribution system within the smart home. 
From a safety and security perspective both are important and 
inter-dependent.  
5.1.1 IoT-based energy control architecture 
The control architectures currently on offer within the home 
are flat networks with shared access to an internet router. This 
is a weak architecture from a security perspective, lacking any 
separation between personal devices and the components that 
control mains electricity consumption and storage. Good 
practice in control and automation system design is to adopt an 
architecture based on the IEC 63443-1-1 standard [23] with 
protected functional zones separated by secured conduits. The 
current lack of separation and security increases the risk of a 
Mirai-style attack, providing an attractive target for malware 
developers to develop attacks that disrupt both the control of 
domestic appliances and the implementation of the DSR 
system. The use of apps and web-based portals to control smart 
appliances is a seriously vulnerability if the software is not 
developed in line with good engineering practices and the 
principles set out in the recently published guidance on Secure-
by-Design [24, 25]. The design of both the in-home and 
network-based elements of the DSR system should be based 
on architectural patterns that explicitly address safety and 
security. 
Another significant issue is the location of the CEM, if this is 
remotely delivered as a cloud service there may be significant 
safety security issues in the event of any service outage or 
denial service attacks affecting the service provider. Requiring 
a functional local CEM to be installed would enable a 
minimum operating capacity to be maintained in the home in 
the event of disruption or loss of connection to any cloud-
based service. 
5.1.2 Physical energy distribution system 
Currently, most domestic electricity systems are relatively 
simple, comprising: a single-phase supply via an isolator and 
fuse denoting the boundary between the connection from the 
distribution system operator (DSO) and the home wiring; a 
meter; one or more distribution boards connected to lighting, 
mains sockets, fixed appliances; and where fitted electric 
heating systems. The system illustrated in Figure 1 is 
significantly more complex with two/three source of supply 
(the public supply from the DSO, the solar panels and the 
energy stored in the battery). Fast charging of one or more eVs 
is likely to exceed the 80-100A capacity of a domestic single-
phase supply and some DSOs are already offering 3-phase 
supply to new developments. Although not discussed earlier in 
this paper, the future domestic energy system is likely to have 
the capability to export energy to the electricity supply system 
from both solar cells, any battery system and from eVs. This 
further complicates the interconnections and metering required 
between the different energy sources. 
These developments will require a significantly more complex 
distribution system within the home and a potential need to 
integrate the switching and isolation elements with control 
signals provided by the IoT-based energy control architecture. 
For electrical safety reasons this integration will need to fail 
safe and secure. The necessary architecture and interlocks are 
more akin to an industrial control solution than the relatively 
simple systems found in a domestic environment today. The 
requirements for electrical installations [6] should in future 
address this architecture and any integral computer-based 
control functionality to ensure existing safety standards are 
maintained, thus reducing potential risks to the consumer and 
their home. 
5.2. Product and system assurance 
A report on security and interoperability of smart appliances 
[5] identified a lack of appropriate security standards. In 
developing these standards there is a need to go beyond the 
prevalent security goals of IT systems, i.e. confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Instead the new standards should 
address the four security domains (people, process, physical 
and technology) and the eight goals identified in Figure 2, 
supported by an appropriate and effective governance regime.  
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Figure 2 - Security domains and goals [26] 
Enforcement of compliance with security standards for 
domestic energy-related IoT devices and DSR enabled 
appliances should be based on testing and certification 
schemes that have traditionally applied to electrical goods. 
This is good engineering practice and will provide a degree of 
assurance to consumers that the products they are using will 
not undermine their safety or security or their home’s. 
5.3. Legislation and regulation 
The UK electricity supply market is underpinned by legislation 
and a complex regulatory regime. Appropriate provision will 
be necessary in both the legislation and regulations, so as to 
establish standards and codes of practice that 
manufacturers/suppliers of smart appliance and new DSR 
participants are required to adopt.  In light of the behaviour of 
some internet-based corporations, reliance upon voluntary 
codes of practice is likely to provide little incentive for them 
to achieve the levels of safety, security and resilience needed 
to protect consumers, their homes and the UK electricity 
supply system. 
The regulatory regime will also need to address how the 
interactions between different EMS will be managed in multi-
occupancy buildings (e.g. flats), at street and substation level. 
This will be necessary to ensure that tariff or other signals 
given to one home are consistent and complimentary with 
those given to other homes sharing the same infrastructure, i.e. 
a home’s energy supply and the related distribution 
infrastructure are not jeopardised due to competition between 
EMS providers. 
5.3. Consumer education and awareness 
The market for smart domestic energy solutions is rapidly 
expanding with new entrants facing few barriers to the creation 
and sale of IoT devices that can control mains powered objects. 
There is relatively little information available to consumers 
about the security and safety risks associated with remote 
control of electrical devices and appliances. This needs to be 
rectified if we are to reduce the risk of death, injury and 
damage caused by naïve or malicious use of these smart 
solutions.  
Consumers need to understand the limitations, security and 
safety issues associated with smart products, including the 
potential for devices failing to respond to commands for 
technical reasons, e.g. the unpairing of devices from their 
controller. Consumer awareness and education should be 
addressed as part of the set up or configuration of smart 
solutions and appliances. 
6 Conclusions and future work 
This paper has identified a number of architectural and security 
issues that affect the development and use of IoT devices to 
control domestic electricity use. The impact of poor security 
may be felt not only in the smart home, it may result in 
disruption or damage to the UK’s electricity supply network. 
Further work is required to develop appropriate security 
standards for the roll-out of DSR, addressing security at 
component, home and system levels. This work should include 
the development of IoT architectural patterns that allow the 
separation of control functions and commands/signalling from 
other domestic Internet traffic so as to maintain system 
integrity, resilience and responsiveness.  
A broad attack surface will be presented by the future smart 
home. The potential mitigation measures discussed in this 
paper should be applied in a holistic fashion, adopting a system 
engineering approach rather than focussing solely on securing 
individual boxes IoT devices or appliances.  
Work is also required to consider how interactions of DSR 
signals from competing EMS providers may affect the 
operation and integrity of the electricity supply network within 
the DSOs networks.  This work will need to address: 
a) Mixed-mode DSR, i.e. combined use of direct appliance 
control and tariff signals via the smart meter; 
b) operation when cyber security threats impair or prevent 
the responses to demand signals from one or more EMS; 
and  
c) effects of competition between EMS providers on 
substation and premises level energy supply. 
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